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Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes
Africa is a latecomer to democratization. In terms of timing, Africa
has followed rather than led other continents in giving birth to the reform
movements that have installed elected governments, multiparty systems,
and more open societies around the world. Since many African countries
are dependent on foreign aid, they have also experienced weighty external
pressures to liberalize. One should not automatically conclude, however,
that the impetus for reform comes from outside the continent rather than
from within.
If political liberalization were a Northern idea being foisted on an
unwilling South, then certain empirical facts should follow. One would
expect Africans to 1) be unaware of the concept of democracy; 2) have
distinct cultural understandings of its content; 3) be unsupportive of
regimes based on competitive principles; 4) prefer alternative political
regimes; and 5) be unsatisfied with the performance of democratic
regimes in practice.
Alternatively, if there is popular awareness of, support for, and
satisfaction with recent political reforms in African countries, one can
conclude that democratization has an indigenous base. It is important to
know this because democracy can help alleviate Africa’s problems only
if it is embraced by Africans themselves.
To measure public attitudes in Africa, we employ an original set of
data from a large-scale, crossnational survey research project known as
the Afrobarometer. This essay reports the results of surveys taken
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between July 1999 and February 2000 in Botswana, Ghana, Malawi,
Namibia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.1 A caveat is in order about general-
ization. The six countries selected, which are all English-speaking
territories that have recently undergone political transitions to electoral
democracy, are not completely representative of sub-Saharan Africa as
a whole. We do not argue that our findings can be extended to Franco-
phone Africa, to the continent’s remaining authoritarian regimes, or to
states that are imploding through civil war. When we refer to “Africans,”
we have a more limited populace in mind.
Africans (so defined) overwhelmingly support democracy and reject
authoritarian regimes. They are much less happy with the way that
democracy actually works, however, though a majority is satisfied in
five out of the six countries we studied. The fact that survey respondents
support democracy even when dissatisfied with its capacity to deliver
suggests that Africans are committed to democracy for intrinsic as well
as instrumental reasons.
Let us now turn to a more detailed examination of our findings.
1) Awareness of democracy. Because democracy means different
things to different people, we began by asking “What, if anything, do
you understand by the word ‘democracy’?” Although the question was
posed in the local language of the respondents’ choice, the word
“democracy” was always presented in English. To all survey respondents
who suggested a meaning, we attributed an awareness of democracy.
All those who replied that they didn’t know what democracy meant—or
had never heard the word—were considered to be unaware. By this
criterion, the concept of democracy is recognizable to most Africans.
More than seven out of ten respondents (74 percent) were able to
volunteer a definition of the term.2 By no stretch of the imagination can
democracy be described as a construct that would be strange and
incomprehensible to them.
Yet interesting crossnational variations exist. The level of public
awareness of democracy ranges from a low of 65 percent in Namibia to
a high of 88 percent in Malawi (see Table 1 on the facing page). We
speculate that political ideas spread more easily in geographically small
countries with high population densities than in large, underpopulated
countries. Urbanization probably helped to increase awareness of democ-
racy in Ghana (72 percent aware, 36 percent urban) and Nigeria (77
percent aware, 43 percent urban). Education also fosters awareness, as
we will explore later.
2) The meaning of democracy. What do Africans think democracy
means? We asked the question in an open-ended way to allow res-
pondents to answer in their own words. We adopted this procedure so
as not to overlook any distinctive meanings that Africans might attach.
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As it happened, though, our interviewees tend to have arrived at under-
standings of democracy that are universal rather than culturally
specific.
First, with few exceptions, the survey respondents attached a positive
value to democracy. Among those people aware of the concept, more
than nine out of ten (92 percent) believed that democracy was a public
“good” that in some way would make conditions “better” (see the Figure
on the following page). Fewer than 1 percent saw democracy as “bad”
in any way. This small minority thought that democratic reforms brought
elite corruption, conflict among social interests, or “confusion” in
political life. The remainder (8 percent) saw democracy in neutral terms,
usually as a “change of government” or as “civilian politics,” without
implying that a new regime would be better or worse than its predecessor.
Second, respondents understand democracy in procedural as well as
substantive terms. This finding runs counter to much of the scholarly
literature, which paints democratization in Africa as a quest for equal
social and economic outcomes. This portrayal is often accompanied by
a critique of procedures like constitutional reform and multiparty elec-
tions as mere formalities. Yet in defining democracy, almost seven out
of ten of our survey respondents (69 percent) refer to political procedures
like the protection of human rights, participation in decision-making,
and voting in elections, while fewer than one in five (17 percent) refer
to substantive outcomes like peace and unity, social and economic
development, and equality and justice. Thus, when left unprompted, the
TABLE 1—POPULAR ATTITUDES TO DEMOCRACY
SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1999–2000
(PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL SAMPLE, INCLUDING “DON’T KNOWS”)
BOTSWANA GHANA MALAWI NAMIBIA NIGERIA ZIMBABWE
   (n=1200) (n=2004)  (n=1208)  (n=1183)  (n=3603)    (n=1200)
KNOWLEDGE OF DEMOCRACY:
What, if anything, do you understand by
the word “democracy”?         69      72       88        65      77         70
(percentage of respondents able to supply a
meaning)
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY:
Democracy is preferable to any other
kind of government.         82      76       66        57      81         71
(percentage choosing this option)
REJECTION OF NONDEMOCRATIC
ALTERNATIVES:
Military rule         85      89       82        59      90         79
One-party state         78      80       77        63      88         74
(percentage rejecting these alternatives)
EXTENT OF DEMOCRACY:
How democratic is the way [your
country] is governed today?         46      —       34        30      17         9
(percentage saying “completely democratic”)
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY:
Overall, how satisfied are you with the
way democracy works in [your country]?         75      54       57        63      84         18
(percentage saying “fairly” or “very” satisfied)
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majority of Africans interviewed see democratization as a limited
political process rather than as an expansive socioeconomic trans-
formation.
Moreover, the rank order of substantive interpretations is revealing:
More respondents associate democracy with political goods (such as
peace, order, unity, equality, justice, or national independence, which
together account for 11 percent of responses) than with economic goods
(social and economic development, which accounts for just 5 percent).
The “peace or unity” responses are particularly interesting since none
of the countries in the sample, with the possible exception of Namibia,
employed democratic elections to implement a peace agreement.3 One
would expect an even closer identification of democracy with peace in
countries emerging from civil wars.
But an alternate question about the components of democracy gave
rise to dissonant results. Noting that “people associate democracy with
many diverse meanings,” we asked respondents to say whether a list of
political and economic features were “essential . . . for a society to be
called ‘democratic.’” The list included procedural political features like
“majority rule,” “freedom to criticize the government,” and “regular
elections,” but it also added substantive socioeconomic features like “jobs
for everyone,” “equality in education,” and “a small income gap between
rich and poor.” In two countries (Botswana and Zimbabwe), respondents
rated political and economic attributes as equally essential to democracy.
In three other countries (Malawi, Namibia, and Nigeria), however,
respondents rated economic components as significantly more essential
than political ones. This finding suggests that African conceptions of
democracy also include important substantive elements of economic
delivery.4
Third, popular African conceptions of democracy are, perhaps
unexpectedly, quite liberal. When open-ended responses are analyzed,
FIGURE—THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY,
SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1999–2000




Government by the People (24%)
Social & Economic Development (5%)
Other, neutral (8%)
Other, bad (1%)
Peace & Unity (7%)
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people cite civil liberties and personal freedoms more frequently than
any other meanings (34 percent). These represent a conception of
democracy based on individual rights that stands in marked contrast to
the one-in-a-thousand respondents (0.1 percent) who make reference to
group rights. Thus Africans do not seem to perceive democracy and
associated rights differently than people elsewhere. And to the extent
that they claim such rights as a means of resisting repression at the hands
of an authoritarian ruler, Africans are beginning to think more like
citizens of a constitutional state than clients of a personal patron.
Nevertheless, Africans speak of political freedoms in very general
terms, referring to “freedom as a birthright,” “the right to everything,”
and “control over one’s own life.” This vague language—used by more
than half (56 percent) of those who define democracy in terms of civil
liberties—suggests that the popular conception of human rights remains
highly undifferentiated. When people do mention specific rights, they
overwhelmingly define democracy in terms of freedom of expression
(including the freedoms of speech, press, and dress), which accounts for
35 percent of the references to civil liberties. All other specific freedoms
(of movement, association, property, and religion) together account for
only 9 percent.
Are there crossnational variations in the way citizens understand
democracy? Botswana stands out as the most liberal country, with more
than half of its citizens (55 percent) identifying democracy with civil
and political rights. Nigerians are distinctive insofar as they are almost
twice as likely (38 percent) as any other Africans to see democracy as
“government by the people.” That they also associate democracy with
voting rights (14 percent) is surely attributable to their country’s recent
historic transitional elections. Malawi, for its part, is the only country in
this sample in which more than one in ten persons (11 percent) offer a
substantive definition of democracy. Interestingly, like other Africans,
Malawians see democracy’s substance less in terms of socioeconomic
development than as a guarantee of political order and social harmony,
which, given the country’s regional rivalries, may reflect wishful thinking.
Finally, the meanings imputed to democracy help us interpret the
contrasting levels of democratic awareness noted earlier for Namibia
and Malawi. In 1989, a dominant political party came to power in Nami-
bia in a transition from colonialism that marked the achievement of
state sovereignty. As such, Namibians are significantly more likely than
other Africans to associate democracy with national independence. By
contrast, Malawi’s 1994 transition signaled a largely indigenous pro-
cess involving the collapse of an authoritarian single-party monopoly
and the introduction of open multiparty competition. Thus Malawians
(as well as Nigerians and Ghanaians) equate recent political events in
their country with the installation of democracy rather than with de-
colonization.
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3) Support for democracy. To assess support for democracy, the
Afrobarometer poses a standard question that has been employed in
Barometer surveys in Western Europe, Latin America, and the former
Soviet bloc. It asks: “Which one of these statements do you most agree
with? a) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; b)
In certain situations, a nondemocratic government can be preferable; or
c) For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what form of government we
have.” Those persons who find democracy to be the best form of govern-
ment were deemed to support democracy.
By this measure, three-quarters of our respondents (75 percent)
identified themselves as supporters of democracy. This average figure,
high by global standards, compares with mean scores (recorded in 1995)
of 65 percent for six Eastern and Central European countries and 63
percent for four Latin American countries.5 The strength of commit-
ment to democracy in Africa can be explained in good part by the excep-
tional levels of support in just two countries—Botswana and Nigeria. If
these two countries are excluded and South Africa is brought into the
sample, then the level of support for democracy becomes almost identical
to that in new democracies elsewhere.6
Botswana has the highest levels of support for democracy (82 per-
cent) found so far in any African country (see Table 1 on p. 109). This
appreciative public mood probably reflects a rational assessment that
the country’s stable political regime based on regular elections has
served it well over the past 40 years. By contrast, the high level of
public support for democracy in Nigeria (81 percent) likely reflects
the popular euphoria over the restoration of civilian rule after a
particularly corrupt and repressive interlude of military dictatorship.
While a jubilant mood prevailed at the time of this survey (January
2000), just half a year after the inauguration of an elected government,
there is no guarantee that high levels of support for democracy can be
sustained indefinitely. Note also that support for democracy in Nigeria
varies by region, reflecting a power shift in 1999 from the north to the
south of the country. While support for democracy is high throughout
Nigeria, it is markedly higher in the south (86 percent, even higher
than Botswana) than in the north (75 percent, which matches the
continental standard).
Other country features stand out. For example, Malawians display
much more nostalgia for authoritarian rule than other Africans surveyed.
More than one out of five respondents in Malawi (22 percent) agree that
“in certain situations, a nondemocratic government can be preferable.”
These sentiments are most prevalent in Malawi’s Central Region (30
percent), the homeland and political base of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda,
the country’s former strongman. In Namibia, 20 percent of respondents
“don’t know” whether they support democracy (20 percent), a figure
four times higher than for other African countries in the sample. This
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finding suggests popular doubts about whether the de facto one-party
regime emerging in Namibia is really a democracy at all.
Ghana and Zimbabwe are in the middle range of popular commit-
ment to democracy, even though the two countries were embarked on
very different trajectories at the time of the surveys: Ghana was in the
process of completing an extended transition from military to demo-
cratic rule on the basis of increasingly open elections, while Zimbabwe
was descending into political crisis at the hands of a dictator bent on
retaining power by openly flouting the law. Under such divergent
circumstances, it is perhaps surprising that the mass electorates in these
countries would express such similar levels of commitment to democracy.
This finding (together with the finding of high levels of public support
for democracy in the contrasting cases of Botswana and Nigeria) suggests
that African citizens distinguish between democracy as a political system
(which they support) and the imperfect democratic status of their own
regimes.
4) Opposition to nondemocratic alternatives. To explore this issue
further, we asked respondents to constrast democracy as a concrete
regime form, described as “our present system of government with
regular elections and many parties,” with the “previous regime,” whether
colonial, one-party, or military. Using such regime comparisons, Ghana-
ians rated democracy (6.7 on a scale of 1 to 10) well above “the former
system of military rule” (just 3.6 on the same scale). Malawians, however,
granted the new regime, which permits multiparty elections, only a
slightly higher rating than the old one-party system (6.1 versus 5.4).
We also asked about other alternatives to democracy. Respondents
were informed that “some people say that we would be better off if the
country was governed differently,” and were asked what they thought
of the following alternatives to their current system: military rule, one-
man rule, one-party rule, and rule by traditional leaders. Clear patterns
emerge when regime preferences are probed this way. Generally, we
can reconfirm that Africans living in new democracies wish to retain
their current political regimes and decisively reject nondemocratic
alternatives.
Military government is the least popular form of rule, rejected by an
average of 81 percent of respondents in the six countries surveyed. This
average is pulled up by Nigeria, where a resounding 90 percent said
“never again” to a form of government that they now associate with the
abuses of General Sani Abacha (see Table 1 on p. 109). The proposition
that “the army should come in to govern the country” was rejected with
almost equal vehemence in Ghana (89 percent) and Botswana (85
percent). By contrast, only a modest majority of Namibians (59 percent)
opposed the prospect of the military taking political power. This suggests
that, while neither Botswana nor Namibia has ever experienced a coup,
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citizens of Botswana would be much less likely than their Namibian
counterparts to tolerate one if it ever occurred.
Africans also reject rule by strongmen and single parties. They seem
to see one-man rule and one-party rule as inextricably linked, and very
similar majorities (76 and 77 percent, respectively) shun these options.
Yet cross-country comparisons reveal interesting differences. In
Botswana, Ghana, and Zimbabwe, slightly more respondents oppose one-
man rule than oppose one-party rule. This may indicate that in these
three countries, all of which have relatively well developed political
institutions by African standards, citizens are becoming more attached
to political institutions than to individual leaders.7 Malawi, Namibia,
and Nigeria display a different pattern, with slightly more respondents
opposing one-party rule than opposing one-man rule. Indeed, only a slim
majority of Namibians (56 percent) opposes strongman rule. Other things
being equal, these seem to be the countries where personalistic politics
is most deeply entrenched and poses the biggest threat to the health of
new democracies.
In searching for political regimes appropriate to Africa, we asked
about the contemporary relevance of traditional forms of authority.
Would citizens countenance a return to decision making by chiefs or a
council of elders? Survey respondents everywhere were less resistant to
this option than to military or one-party rule, but opposition to traditional
rule was strongest where chiefs actually retain some real power, formal
or informal, over decision making (Botswana and Ghana). Those who
had actually experienced the involvement of traditional leaders in
governance were most likely to express reservations. And overall, twice
as many respondents repudiated a traditional regime as supported it.
5) Satisfaction with democracy. Do Africans think that their own
countries are governed according to democratic principles? To find out,
the Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents whether their countries
were: (a) completely democratic; (b) democratic, but with minor prob-
lems; (c) democratic but with major problems; or (d) not a democracy.
Nowhere did a majority of respondents think that the current regime
in their country was completely democratic. Even in Botswana, only a
plurality (46 percent) perceived democratization to have been fully
achieved, but the overwhelming majority thought that democracy was
either “complete” or incomplete only in “minor” respects (82 percent).
In Ghana, where the question was asked in a more compact form, 69
percent thought that the country was a democracy, whereas 12 percent
thought that it was not.
These cases, which show some evidence of gradual regime consol-
idation, stand in marked contrast to Namibia and Nigeria. In Namibia, a
plurality of respondents (41 percent) thought that the country was
“democratic, but with minor problems.” In Nigeria, a larger plurality
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(46 percent) was even less optimistic, finding the country “democratic,
but with major problems.” This last assessment strikes us as intuitively
reasonable, especially given the tremendous challenges of recovery and
development that Nigeria’s new elected government must confront with
untested democratic institutions. While Nigerians say they support
democracy at almost the same levels as Botswana, perceptions of the
extent of democracy in the two countries differ dramatically, with the
same proportions of Nigerians seeing “major problems” with their
democracy as Botswanans who see democracy in their own country as
“complete.”
This brings us to Zimbabwe, the exception among the countries studied
here. A majority of Zimbabweans (55 percent) either think that their
country is “not a democracy” or say they “don’t know” or “don’t under-
stand.” The proportion who deny that their country is a democracy (38
percent) is three times larger in Zimbabwe than in Malawi (12 percent)
and 30 times larger than in Nigeria (1 percent), while the proportion of
Zimbabweans who “don’t know” (17 percent) far exceeds the equivalent
proportion in Namibia, a country already noted for having the lowest
levels of popular awareness of democracy in the sample. We suspect
that many Zimbabweans, far from being oblivious to the meaning of
democracy, simply have a hard time thinking of their own country in
these terms during a period of enforced one-party dominance.
At best, then, most respondents regard democracy in Africa as a work
in progress. Because actual regimes imperfectly reflect citizen prefer-
ences, regime performance may not induce popular satisfaction. Much
depends on whether people judge the new regime’s accomplishments
against recollections of a previous regime’s record or against a yardstick
of future expectations. If the former, democracy may appear as the lesser
of two evils; if the latter, democracy is destined to always fall short.
Thus we draw a sharp distinction between support for democracy
and satisfaction with democracy. The former refers to a judgment in the
abstract about one’s preferred form of government. The latter refers to
an assessment of the concrete performance of elected governments. We
also note that satisfaction with democracy is a much more concrete
standard, and therefore it almost always trails support for democracy
wherever it is measured around the world.
The Afrobarometer surveys track satisfaction with democracy by
asking the standard question: “Generally, how satisfied are you with the
way that democracy works in [your country]?” Respondents are offered
the options of “very satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” and “very unsatisfied.”
(In the discussion that follows we describe as satisfied all those who
answered either “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied.”) These results reveal
the widest variation in attitudes reported so far. At one extreme is Nigeria,
where 84 percent of adults interviewed said that they were satisfied with
democracy; at the other extreme stands Zimbabwe, where only 18 percent
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said that they were satisfied. This stark difference can be interpreted as
a contrast between people celebrating a long-awaited transition to
democracy and those bemoaning the intransigence of an entrenched
autocracy. Expressions of satisfaction with democracy are subject to
the exigencies of regime life cycles and must be regarded as much more
volatile than other, more stable attitudes like support for democracy.
The level of satisfaction with democracy in Nigeria could decline if the
administration of Olusegun Obasanjo fails to live up to popular expec-
tations. Similarly, if Robert Mugabe’s party had been defeated in the
June 2000 elections, Zimbabwean respondents might have expressed
more satisfaction with democracy.
Other countries find themselves between these extremes. In terms of
the proportion of people professing themselves “very satisfied” with
democracy, Botswana (32 percent) actually exceeds Nigeria (26 percent),
while Ghana scores lower on satisfaction than its relatively high score
on support for democracy would lead one to expect. When calculated as
a mean for all respondents across the six countries, popular satisfaction
with democracy averages 64 percent. This cross-national average is
inflated by the presence of Nigeria, with its high satisfaction scores and
large sample size. Satisfaction with democracy drops to 59 percent if
sample sizes are standardized by calculating satisfaction as an average
of aggregate country scores (that is, controlling for the large size of the
Nigeria sample). And satisfaction declines further still to 51 percent if
we set aside the two countries (Nigeria and Namibia) where, contrary to
the global pattern, citizens report more satisfaction than support.
Overall, satisfaction with democracy lags behind support for democ-
racy in Africa, and the gap is wider in Africa than in Eastern and Central
Europe or in South America.8 We interpret this to mean not only that
African citizens have inflated expectations of democracy but also that
African governments are often unable to fulfill them.
Understanding Democratic Attitudes
1) The impact of education. A common prediction in social science
is that demographic attributes such as gender, age, and income shape
mass beliefs. We find that, with the exception of education, such factors
have relatively little influence on attitudes to political reform in six
African countries.
Men and women display very similar levels of support for, and satis-
faction with, democracy, differing only in their awareness of democ-
racy: Twenty-one percent of males in the six countries had never heard
of democracy, compared to 31 percent of females. This difference sur-
vived a statistical control for the respondents’ level of education, there-
by suggesting a genuine “gender gap” in awareness of the political
world.
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Neither were there any meaningful distinctions between the attitudes
to democracy expressed by urban and rural respondents. Urban and rural
dwellers in the six countries supported democracy in roughly equal pro-
portions. In five countries (especially Botswana, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe)
urbanites were more likely to express dissatisfaction with the way their
democracy was working, but this general finding was offset by results
from Malawi, where urbanites were more satisfied with democracy than
their country cousins.
Of all demographic factors, education has the greatest observed effects
on attitudes to democracy. Not surprisingly, the higher their educational
attainment, the more likely Africans are to be aware of democracy. Nine
out of ten persons with a university education said that they knew
something about it, whereas just six out of ten persons with no formal
schooling made the same claim. Education also has strong effects on the
numbers of people who equate democracy with “government by the
people.” We are inclined to think that this interpretation of democracy
is a learned response, possibly reflecting exposure to Lincoln’s Gettys-
burg Address in school.
Unlike in the West, however, education does not build support
for democracy in Africa. University postgraduates are no more likely
than people who have never been to school to say that democracy is
“always preferable.” Indeed, the very highly educated in Africa seem
to have qualms about democracy precisely because they fear that it
endows illiterate citizens with political rights that may be exercised
unreflectively or irresponsibly.9 Moreover, educated Africans are criti-
cal of democracy in practice. Only 10 percent of university postgrad-
uates are “very satisfied” with democracy, compared to 32 percent of
those without formal schooling. If educated people are satisfied at all,
they are likely to damn with faint praise by saying they are only “fairly
satisfied.”
2) The eye of the beholder. Individuals who cannot define democracy
are much less attached to it as a preferred form of regime. Compared to
politically conscious citizens, they are twice as likely (19.5 versus 8.9
percent) to say that “it makes no difference to me what form of
government we have.” More interestingly, citizen support for democracy
increases if it is conceived in procedural rather than substantive terms:
81 percent of those who see democracy as “government by the people”
also name it as the best form of regime; the comparable figure is 73
percent for those who define democracy as “social and economic
development”—a small but statistically significant difference. Moreover,
support for democracy is lowest among those who associate it with
“social and economic hardship” (56 percent). Thus support for democracy
seems to be strongest among “minimalists,” for whom democracy’s scope
is limited to setting the rules of the political game, and more tentative
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among “maximalists,” who hope that democracy will herald sweeping
socioeconomic change.
The same applies, but with greater force, to satisfaction with the
way that democracy actually works. The most satisfied citizens are
those who define democracy in terms of the procedural notion of
electoral choice (73 percent). The least satisfied are those who expect
democracy to deliver such substantive goods as economic equality or
social justice (60 percent), social or economic development (58 percent),
and security from crime (57 percent). We conclude that citizens who
have modest expectations—namely, that democracy will enable them
to choose their leaders and participate in decision making (and not much
more!)—are relatively likely to be satisfied with democracy. If,
however, they believe that democracy will automatically provide jobs,
redistribute income, and ensure social peace, they are likely to be
disillusioned. In short, the perceived performance of democracy is partly
in the eye of the beholder.
3) From satisfaction to support. Does satisfaction with democracy
in practice drive overall support for democracy? One might expect that
popular assessments of an elected regime’s performance would deeply
influence whether citizens opt for democracy as their preferred form of
government. The African data support this proposition, though less
strongly than expected. Support is positively related to satisfaction in
five out of the six countries surveyed (see Table 2 above). If “don’t
knows” are excluded, 58 percent of all respondents are both supportive
of and satisfied with democracy. Yet although this relationship is
statistically significant in all five countries, it is strong only in Malawi.
And in Zimbabwe, the relationship runs in the opposite direction, with
high levels of support for democracy coinciding with low levels of
satisfaction.
We interpret these data as follows. On the one hand, in at least five of
TABLE 2—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY
AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY
(PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL SAMPLES, EXCLUDING “DON’T KNOWS”)1
SUPPORT DEMOCRACY SUPPORT AN ALTERNATIVE REGIME2
 SATISFIED WITH  UNSATISFIED WITH  SATISFIED WITH  UNSATISFIED WITH
   DEMOCRACY       DEMOCRACY     DEMOCRACY      DEMOCRACY
Malawi             53              22          13               13
Namibia             54              18          17               11
Ghana             53              26          10               11
Botswana             70              17            7                 6
Nigeria             72              11          14                 6
Zimbabwe             15              59            8               17
All             58              21          12               10
1 Figures may not agree with Table 1 because “don’t knows” are removed in Table 2.  Row percentages
may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
2 Includes those who support nondemocratic alternatives and those for whom the type of regime “does not
matter.”
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our six countries, popular support for democracy has a strong instrumen-
tal component. Citizens extend support to a democratic regime in good
part because they are satisfied with its performance in delivering desired
goods and services. Yet 21 percent of all survey respondents (and 59
percent in Zimbabwe) say that they support democracy in principle even
though they are dissatisfied with the performance of their own regime.
These citizens value democracy intrinsically, that is, not merely as a
means of delivering development but as an end in itself.
These results cast new light on the quality of the democracy emerging
in African countries. Take Zimbabwe, for example, which harbors the
most dissatisfied democrats. Zimbabweans apparently cling intensely
to democracy precisely because their current government has broken
most of the rules of the political game. Thus intrinsic support for the
principle of democracy is best revealed in regimes in crisis, when citizens
have abandoned all pretense of instrumental support for an underperfor-
ming incumbent government.
There is also evidence of intrinsic support for democracy in Ghana.
Three-fourths of Ghanaians endorse democracy even though only half
of them are satisfied with the way it works in practice. In other words,
the quality of the “democracy” they have experienced under soldier-
turned-civilian Jerry Rawlings falls short of the ideal regime they would
prefer. Such intrinsic attachments suggest that the democracy is relatively
well-established in Ghana, a country that once led Africa to political
independence.
Table 2 should not be read as raising concerns about Botswana, which
our surveys portray as the paragon of African democracies. This country
has the highest levels of expressed support for democracy in the sample,
but most of this support appears on the surface to be instrumental. At
this time, we do not know if high levels of instrumental satisfaction in
Botswana mask high underlying levels of intrinsic support. Nor can this
issue be resolved unless the regime undergoes a period of crisis. Should
economic or political performance ever take a serious turn for the worse,
and should public attachment to democracy falter in response, then
democracy will have been revealed to be less secure in Botswana than
commonly thought. More likely, however, as in the case of Zimbabwe,
citizen attachment to democracy in Botswana will then be revealed as
being deep-seated.
Finally, Nigeria and Namibia are the only two countries in Africa—
and possibly the world—where more citizens report satisfaction with
democracy than support for it. In these countries, even people who do
not support democracy in principle stand ready and willing to consume
the products of a regime that calls itself democratic. Citizens here seem
to be instrumentalists par excellence. Many of them apparently care less
about the form of government than about the capacity of rulers—any
rulers—to deliver the goods. Under these circumstances, we are tempted
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to conclude that the consolidation of democracy is a distant prospect in
both these countries.
The Legitimacy of Democracy in Africa
At this time, several leading sub-Saharan African countries display a
significant degree of popular support for democracy. Yet there are rea-
sons to be concerned about the limited depth of this attachment and the
quality of democracy that is emerging.
There can be little doubt that democracy, broadly defined, has attained
wide legitimacy in Africa. More than seven out of ten respondents to six
national Afrobarometer surveys in late 1999 and early 2000 named it as
their preferred form of government. Since military and one-party rule are
discredited in these countries, support for democracy is not seriously
compromised by large pockets of authoritarian nostalgia. These findings
also suggest that, while outsiders may have influenced political reform in
Africa, democratic sentiments have their own indigenous sources.
Yet while popular support for democracy seems to be a mile wide, it
may be only an inch deep. Even though many Africans interpret democ-
racy in universal terms, and value it intrinsically as well as instrumentally,
their understanding of democratic principles is extremely vague. Edu-
cation can help to offset some of these shortcomings by closing gaps in
political knowledge, but it does not always deepen commitment to demo-
cratic values. Moreover, compared to citizens in other regions of the
non-Western world, Africans express considerable dissatisfaction with
the performance of their elected governments. In every African country
that we surveyed, majorities of the adult population regard their new
democracies as seriously incomplete. Thus, when it comes to building
democracy, Africans themselves acknowledge that much work remains
to be done.
NOTES
1. All samples are national probability samples. The sample sizes for each country
are shown in Table 1. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3 percent (2 percent
in Nigeria). Fieldwork was conducted by national research institutions affiliated with the
Afrobarometer project, to whom we are grateful. The authors acknowledge research
funding from the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International
Development. Trained interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews in local languages
with a total of 10,398 respondents, using a questionnaire that contained a core of common
items.
2. Except where noted, all crossnational averages are calculated as the raw mean of
the total population interviewed. This has the effect of representing countries in proportion
to their sample sizes.
3. Namibians actually chose the “peace or unity” option less frequently (5 percent)
than all respondents (6 percent).
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4. At first we wondered whether respondents were led by the closed-ended list, being
prompted to choose substantive attributes that they would not freely associate with
democracy if asked in a completely undirected way. But factor analysis shows that political
and economic responses cluster along separate dimensions and that people who emphasize
democracy’s political procedures are not necessarily those who emphasize its economic
substance.
5. New Democracies Barometer IV (1995), cited in William Mishler and Richard
Rose, “Five Years After the Fall: Trajectories in Support for Democracy in Post-
Communist Europe,” Studies in Public Policy 298 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde,
Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1998): 13; Latinobarómetro (1995), cited in Juan
J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), 222.
6. See Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic
or Instrumental?” British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming 2001). The unstan-
dardized average score for Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe (1999), and South Africa
(1997) is 65 percent.
7. In Ghana and Zimbabwe, however, opposition to strongman rule also surely reflects
popular disaffection with sitting leaders who have outstayed their welcome. Since some
of these differences fall within the surveys’ margins of sampling error, they should not
be overinterpreted.
8. With data from New Democracies Barometer IV (1998), we estimate an average
support satisfaction gap for Eastern and Central Europe (6 countries) of about 5 percentage
points. With data from the Latinobarómetro (1995), we estimate an average gap for South
America (4 countries) of about 13 percentage points. Depending on how it is measured,
the average gap for sub-Saharan African countries in 1999–2000 is between 11 and 21
percentage points.
9. Among Zambians, for example, educated persons are less likely to agree with the
principle of universal suffrage. They are also less likely to vote. See Michael Bratton,
“Political Participation in a New Democracy: Institutional Considerations from Zambia,”
Comparative Political Studies 32 (August 1999): 564.
